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By EDWARD M. STE °mu *
INTRODUCTION
From the franchisor's viewpoint, the franchise system enables
a small or medium-sized company to exploit regional and national
markets which would otherwise be inaccessible to the franchisor
because of capital requirements. In a recent hearing before the
Senate Select Committee on Small Business, it was reported that
there are approximately 1,200 franchisors in the United States
with between 400,000 and 670,000 franchisees doing a total busi-
ness between 90 and 100 billions of dollars each year. Moreover,
these figures do not include some 83,000 franchise automobile
dealers or the estimated 225,000 retail service station dealers who
can be included as franchisees.-
While there may be legitimate questions as to the motives of
some franchisors, the franchise system has undoubtedly provided
numerous worthwhile economic and social benefits. For example,
it can be asserted with considerable conviction that if there were
no franchise systems available, the sources for the goods and
services distributed in this country would be comprised primarily
of very large vertically integrated concerns or a large number of
economically weak, local distributors. Thus, assuming that there
are economic benefits to be derived from a marketing system
which includes numerous competing units at the retail level, the
franchise system provides means for increasing the number of
competing units while also providing means for local entrepre-
neurs to operate franchise units which can compete effectively
with outlets of large vertically integrated suppliers. It has been
* Bachelor of Chemical Engineering, University of Louisville, 1959; J.D.,
University of Louisville, 1964; L.L.M., George Washington University, 1971; At-
torney Adviser, Office of General Counsel, Small Business Administration, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1969-71; Assistant United States Attorney, 1971-72; Partner, Goldberg &
Lloyd, Louisville, Kentucky, 1972.
1 Busnss WE=K, January 23, 1970.
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noted that franchising has been successful, in part, because it
permits the franchisee and the franchisor to combine the advan-
tages of individual ownership with many of the efficiencies of
large scale vertically integrated operations, 2 and provides a means
for individuals with limited capital to become successful business-
men when they would otherwise remain employees.
FRANCMSE DISTRMUTION
The term franchising is, in its broadest terms, indiscriminately
applied to different arrangements used in the distribution of goods
and services to the ultimate consumer. The most common use of
the term refers to the distribution of goods or services in con-
nection with a trademark owned by a franchisor-icensor where
the franchisee-licensee distributes the goods or services pursuant
to an agreement with the franchisor-licensor.3 In one such ar-
rangement, the franchisee does business under the name and in
accordance with the style and format of the franchisor. Depend-
ing on the goods or services involved, these franchise agreements
may also provide for the franchisee to manufacture goods for
resale under the trademark and in accordance with the specifica-
tions of the franchisor. The product manufactured by the fran-
chisee, for example hamburgers, ice cream, or soft drinks, may be
offered for sale in a standard, uniform manner through standard-
ized outlets which are planned, developed, and supervised by the
franchisor. The other broad category of franchising includes
arrangements in which the manufacturer sells a trademarked
product to a distributor for resale through the distributor's own
independent outlet and under the distributor's own name. In such
arrangements the franchisor provides certain inducements for the
franchisee to agree to distribute the products. For example, the
franchisor may agree with the franchisee that he will refrain from
appointing other distributors in the defined area in which the
franchisee or distributor does business. Franchise agreements are
also used to offer services, and in such arrangements the franchisee
may provide the services under the franchisor's trademark in
2 Hearings on Distribution Problems Affecting Small Business, S. Res. 40,
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 8 (1965).
3 See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1964).
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accordance with the procedures, specifications and format of the
franchisor.
In franchise contracts where a trademark is licensed to, and
used by a franchisee, whether the franchisee does business under
the style and format of the franchisor or not, the franchisee relies
on the goodwill previously established in the trademark. Thus,
all franchisees of the trademark have a common interest in protec-
tion of this goodwill. In addition to this vested interest in con-
tinued goodwill of the trademark, the franchisor likewise has a
statutory obligation4 to assure the continuing quality of goods or
services provided under the trademark, as hereinafter discussed.
Accordingly, trademark franchise agreements commonly impose
certain restraints on the methods and means by which franchisees
conduct their business. Some such restraints are ultimately
determined to be legitimate' while other such restraints are
frequently found to be in direct conflict with the objectives and
purposes of the Antitrust Laws.6
From the standpoint of a business organization, the trademark
franchise agreements where the franchisor licenses the franchisee
to follow the franchisor's standard method of doing business and
the franchisee does business in the name of the franchisor fall
somewhere between the ordinary distribution system of inde-
pendent retail outlets and a completely vertically integrated distri-
bution system where all levels of manufacture and distribution
are under common ownership. Trademark franchise systems can
therefore be described as an arrangement or attempt by a fran-
chisor to duplicate the advantages of a fully integrated manu-
facturing and distribution system without the necessity of pro-
viding the capital to establish such a system. As previously
described, in a trademark franchise agreement, the trademark
owner must maintain a degree of control over operation of the
individual franchise outlets. Necessarily, the franchisee sacrifices
a degree of independence because of the franchisor's need to
maintain control over the necessary aspects of operation of the
individual retail outlet and the common interest all franchisees
have in continued goodwill of the franchise system. In a franchise
4 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et. seq. (1970).
5 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
6 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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system where the franchisor merely agrees to sell his trademarked
products to a designated exclusive distributor in a specific area,
the franchisor may have a diminished legitimate interest in the
methods by which the franchisee conducts his business. This is
especially true under those arrangements where the franchisee
does not operate under the name of the franchisor. In general,
legitimate restraints on the operations of a franchisee relate to
those restraints which are reasonably ancillary to the maintenance
of control and uniformity of quality, ethical standards, and success-
ful management of franchise locations, as well as fulfilling the
trademark owner's statutory obligation with respect to maintain-
ing the quality and uniformity of goods or services distributed
under the trademark. The legitimacy of restraints on the fran-
chisee is the focal point of this article.
Product Franchising
As previously noted, there are several broad categories of
franchise agreements and the type selected by a particular fran-
chisor is determined by a number of factors including the product
or service to be distributed, the strength of the franchisor relative
to the bargaining power of his prospective franchisees, and the
competitive ability and method of operation of competitors of the
franchisor.
Product franchising is used herein to describe the means for
distribution of a product under the franchisor's trademark where
the trademark product is manufactured by the franchisor, or under
his specifications, and then distributed by franchisees through the
next line of distribution,' including arrangements where the goods
are consigned to such franchisees." Product franchising is used to
market a variety of goods such as automobiles, bicycles, packaged
food products, etc. In most product franchising arrangements the
franchisee does business under his own name although his business
name may be indirectly linked with the trademarked product.
Trademark or Tradename Franchising
The term trademark or tradename franchising is another sub-
7 Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 321 F.2d 825 (1963).
8 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 888 U.S. 365 (1967).
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definition of franchising as used herein. It relates to an arrange-
ment where the franchisee is granted a license authorizing him
to engage in business under the name and trademark of the
franchisor where the franchisee conducts his business in the
standard uniform manner prescribed by the franchisor for use with
the trademark or tradename. Such trademark franchises are com-
monly recognized and associated with restaurants, motels, fast
food establishments, and laundry and dry cleaning shops. Trade-
mark franchising is also commonly used in connection with major
manufacturing or processing operations requiring large invest-
ments of capital and the establishment of sub-distribution sys-
tems.9 Such arrangements are frequently used in distribution of
bakery products, soft drinks, mattresses,10 and other items. In
some instances such franchisors have been associations composed,
at least in part, of the licensees or franchisees.
Both trademark licensing franchise arrangements and product
franchising arrangements are closely related. However, while
they bear resemblance in many respects and encounter very similar
problems, there are certain antitrust questions which arise from,
and are affected adversely or favorably by, the existence of the
trademark license agreement which are not encountered in other
distribution systems. The following discussion is directed to cer-
tain antitrust questions which occur in trademark franchising and
product franchising and the differences or advantages, if any,
accruing by the existence of the trademark.
STATUTORY REGULATION
Congress has enacted three major statutes which affect and
regulate competition in the conduct of business in interstate or
foreign commerce. These statutes, the Sherman Act," Sections
2-4 of the Clayton Act,'2 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act regulate and affect the methods of doing business and
competition at all functional levels from the manufacturer or
trademark owner-licensor to the retail outlets.
The Sherman Act prohibits, in its broadest terms, restraints
9 Pollock, Antitrust Problems in Franchising, 15 N.Y.L.F. 106 (1969).
10 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1966).
1115 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-15 (1970).
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which unreasonably affect the flow of interstate or foreign com-
merce. Section 1 of the Act condemns collective conduct in
restraint of trade by prohibiting every contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade. Section 2, in general, prohibits
both joint and individual efforts toward monopoly in "any part
of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations."
The requisite affect on competition is only minimal as noted
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,3
"[t]he fact that the ultimate object of the conspiracy charged
was the fixing or maintenance of local retail prices, does not of
itself remove it from the scope of the Sherman Act... ." With
respect to franchisors, the Act prohibits, for example, suppliers
or franchisors from engaging jointly or severally in restraint
of trade (e.g., price fixing, market allocations, boycotts, or other
devices, which unreasonably restrain franchisees in the conduct
of their business with franchisors, other franchisees, or others).
The Act likewise applies to franchisees in that it prohibits them
from indulging in comparable restraints of trade (e.g., one or more
franchisees may not seek to monopolize a local market where the
effect of the action affects commerce across state boundaries).
Moreover, the franchisees may not conspire, combine, or otherwise
agree to engage in concerted activities to force the franchisor to
engage in any practices which have an adverse affect on com-
petition.
The Clayton Act of 1914, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act of 1936,'1 prohibits certain limited forms of restraint on com-
petition. It applies only if the prohibited conduct occurred in the
course of interstate commerce; the Sherman Act requires only an
effect on interstate commerce. Therefore, the proof of jurisdiction
under the Clayton Act, Sections 2 and 3, is somewhat more
difficult in cases where the complaint is based on conditions
limited mainly to local markets. For purposes of this discussion,
only Section 3 of the Clayton Act 5 is considered, but it should be
noted that Section 2 of the Act,'" as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, dealing with price discrimination between purchasers
's 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945).
14 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
1515 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
16 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
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of goods from the same seller, can apply to the franchise relation-
ships where the franchisor supplies goods to different franchisees
at different prices so that the effect of the price discrimination may
be to substantially lessen competition in a line of commerce.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act is directed against the use of
exclusive dealing arrangements, total requirement contracts, and
so-called "tying arrangements" which provide that goods will be
made available only on the conditions that other, different, goods
are also purchased from the same seller. This section prohibits
such conduct where the probable effect "may be" to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in a line of com-
merce. Thus, the actions under consideration need not actually
restrain trade but need only tend to substantially restrain trade.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 17 provides that any person "in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the Antitrust Laws has a private right of action for treble
damages plus the cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney's
fee." Section 4 has been interpreted to apply to the Sherman Act
and to Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 8
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, while not strictly
an antitrust law is an important trade regulation statute. In sub-
stance the statute is a catch-all prohibition of unfair methods of
competition or deceptive actions or practices. It is basically regu-
latory in nature and vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal
Trade Commission established thereby. The unfair methods of
competition prohibited by the Act include, but are not limited to,
the acts or practices prohibited by the Sherman Act, and the
Clayton Act, as well as incipient violations of these Acts, and
other deceptive acts or practices. In this regard the Federal
Trade Commission Act has been interpreted to give the Federal
Trade Commission a zone of exclusive authority to restrain ar-
rangements and practices which threaten to develop into viola-
tions of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.' 9
Trm FRANcmsE PROGRAm
Franchisors impose controls on franchisees for at least two
essential reasons. First, a franchisor believes, usually with justfi-
17 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
18 Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 378 (1958).
19 Fed. Trade Comrm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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cation supported in part by the statutory requirements of the
Lanham Act,20 that he must impose certain restrictions to protect
his trademark and the goodwill of his franchise system. Such
restrictions take various forms including specialization of products
the franchisee can sell at the franchise outlet, sources of supply of
raw materials for the trademarked item, and restrictions on other
types of goods to be sold by the franchisee. Second, franchisors
impose controls on their licensed franchisees to sustain the
desirability and value of the franchise. Such controls include
assigning franchisees particularly defined areas in return for which
the franchisor agrees that he will not grant other franchisees an
opportunity to do business in the area. The foregoing and other
restrictions may or may not be legal depending upon the sur-
rounding circumstances.
The practice of imposing restrictions on the conduct of busi-
ness is generally considered to have begun with agreements not
to compete, imposed by the buyer on the seller of a business as a
covenant in the sale agreement. Subsequently, limitations on
granting a trademark or tradename in connection with the sale
of a business were included in sales agreements because the trans-
fer of the trademark or tradename was understood to be an
important factor in the transfer of the associated business. Ac-
ceptance of this transfer of trademark and tradename rights with
the sale of the business led to the idea of granting a license for
use of a trademark and manufacture and sale of products without
the sale of the original business itself. In such licensing activities
certain obligations were imposed on the use of the trademark to
prevent deception in connection with the licensed trademark.
Basically, the restrictions and obligations have been carried over
by the Lanham Act.21 The obligations include the requirement
that the trademark owner maintain adequate control over use of
the trademark to assure minimum standards of quality or uni-
formity; failure to do so can lead to loss of the trademark.
2 2
Extension of this concept depends on the transfer of trademark
rights to agreements to license manufacturers or sellers in areas
where the trademark owner could not, or did not intend to, expand
20 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1064 (1970).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
ICN~ucc LAw JouRNAL
his business, so that the goodwill of the mark is extended without
significant capital outlay by the trademark owner. Thus, while the
trademark was initially a designation of source or origin of the
product it has later come to be recognized as an assurance of
quality, regardless of the actual source of origin of the product.
In most franchise agreements of the type discussed, the trade-
mark or tradename license and the associated goodwill are among
the primary assets of the franchise package. This is because the
public buys the franchise product or service in response to the
familiar trademark. The value of this trademark in commercial
activity has been recognized by the courts. A typical judicial
attitude is illustrated by the statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S.
Kresge, although a pre-Lanham Act case, still accurately describes
the character and effect of trademarks:
The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A
trademark is a merchandising shortcut which induces the pur-
chaser to select what he wants or what he has been led to be-
lieve he wants. The owner of a mark exploits his human pro-
pensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere
of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to con-
vey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers,
the desirability of a commodity upon which it appears. Once
it is attained, the trademark owner has something of value.23
The Lanham Act 24 codified much of the common law of
trademark licensing. The Act expressly provides for trademark
licensing by providing that the registered mark may be used by
an "unrelated company" and that such use will inure to the
benefit of the registrant without adversely affecting the validity
of the mark so long as the registrant has taken steps to assure that
the mark is not "used in a manner to deceive the public." 25 The
Lanham Act defines a related company as one which legitimately
controls or is controlled with respect to the nature and quality of
23316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
24See note 4 supra.
25 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
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the goods and services in connection with which the mark is
used.20 The Act further provides for loss of exclusive right to use
the mark, inter alia, if the mark is used to violate the antitrust
laws of the United States or becomes descriptive of the goods sold
under the trademark. Thus, the law imposes two difficult and
sometimes conflicting trademark limitations on the licensor. He
must control the use of the mark by his licensees to prevent decep-
tion of the public, while on the other hand, the restraints imposed
cannot be unreasonably restrictive. If he goes too far in either
direction, he risks the loss of exclusive rights in his trademark.
CONTROL TECHNIQUES
Trademark franchises employ various control techniques to
meet the requirements of trademark protection,28 e.g. uniformity
of style, appearance, quality and value, as well as maintenance of
the desirability and profitability of the overall franchise operation.
An example of this is where a franchisee conducts a retail business
under a franchisor's name. In this situation the law recognizes
that within limits, the franchisor's efforts to protect the trademark
will undoubtedly require more detailed control over the fran-
chisee's business choices than in the case of mere resale of a
vendee's product.29 Where the franchisee conducts his business
in his own name or style of business, the extent of permissible
control of the franchisor is correspondingly diminished.
Alleged antitrust violations with respect to the franchisor-
franchisee relationship are almost invariably based on the restric-
tions imposed by the franchisor. The allegation is usually to the
effect that the restriction is a per se violation of the antitrust
laws. A per se violation means that the practice cannot be justified
regardless of the franchisor's reason for imposing the condition. 0
However, in cases where restraint is not unreasonable per se, but
is merely a potentially unreasonable restraint of trade, the fran-
chisor can avoid liability by proving that the restriction imposed
is ancillary to a legitimate business purpose and that the restric-
tion does not unreasonably restrain trade.
26 Id.
27 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1970).
2 8 Susser v. Carvel, 882 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 9 United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 850 (1966).
3
0 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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The most common restraints imposed by franchisors are di-
rected to:
1. Customers to whom the franchisee may sell;
2. The territory in which the franchisee may market the
trademark licensed products or otherwise do business;
3. The products which the franchisee may handle at the fran-
chise location including limitations on those which he can-
not sell;
4. Sources of supply for raw materials and raw material and
product specification; and,
5. Restrictions affecting the price of products or services dis-
tributed by the franchisee.
If the restraint is not illegal per se, then several factors are
considered in determining the legality of such restraint. Initially
a determination can be made as to whether the restraint is ver-
tically imposed by the franchisor, who is independent of the
franchisees, or whether the restraint is imposed as part of a
horizontal arrangement imposed by collaboration among its fran-
chisees and whether the franchisor is under control of, or acting
on behalf of certain of the franchisees. While the particular
restraint may not be illegal, per se, illegality may be found if the
source of the restraint is horizontal pressure and the purpose of
the restraint is to diminish competition. If the restraint is ver-
tically imposed rather than horizontally imposed and considered
not illegal per se, legality may then be determined by the justifi-
cation the franchisor provides for the restraint. In order to
prevail, the franchisee may have the burden of showing why other
less confining restraints could not have been used to achieve the
desired effect, as well as at least an intention on the part of the
franchisor to achieve some legitimate ancillary goal. In a recent
address the Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission,
Everett Macntyre, outlined three factors which should be con-
sidered in determining the legality of restraints or controls on
franchisees:
1. Whether the franchise program has as its main purpose the
establishment of a group of franchisees who are compelled
to purchase products from the franchisor, or sources desig-
nated by the franchisor, many times at prices above market
and that such a system might by itself constitute an unfair
[Vol. 60
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method of competition of violation of Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act;
2. If a franchise program requires a franchisee to submit to
control by the franchisor then such controls must be justi-
fied and justification for the controls must be carefully
considered, and when the franchise agreements relate to
trademark licenses where the franchisee manufactures the
trademarked product, the franchisor may be required to
justify the quality controls it imposes on the franchisee
even though the Lanham Act has been held to require the
owner to exercise control over operations of the related
companies using its trademarks; and,
3. The competitive impact of controls are to be considered
such as the effect of the controls on the freedom of the pur-
chaser (i.e. franchisee) to purchase from the open market,
the size of the market, and the strength of and direct im-
pact of the program on competitors.8 '
Resale Price Maintenance
In certain cases franchisors find it desirable to impose resale
price maintenance agreements with respect to goods or services
offered in connection with trademark licensing programs. Direct
imposition of these agreements is, in virtually all cases, illegal
under the Sherman Act. 2 However, in spite of the per se illegality
franchisors still seek to impose such arrangements, for example,
in cases where the prices of the trademarked goods or services
are advertised in connection with the franchise licensing pro-
gram or where price uniformity is important to the image of
its franchise program. However, no such foundation will sup-
port a price maintenance program, and regardless of whether
it is vertically or horizontally imposed, such a program is
illegal. Such inability to maintain uniform prices through fran-
chise locations is obviously irritating to a franchisor who is in
direct competition with a vertically integrated concern which is
clearly free to maintain or vary retail prices at will.
In spite of the foregoing there are a few actions which seller
or franchisors can assert with respect to purchasers who refuse to
31 Excerpts from Address by Everette MacIntyre, Conference of International
Franchise Association, May 8, 1969, TRADE REG. REP. II 50.240 (1961).
32 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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maintain prices. But, such actions are of only limited effectiveness
and even these limited actions inherently invite serious risk of
liability. For example, in United States v. Colgate & Co.,"3 the
Supreme Court upheld the right of a seller to refuse to deal with a
customer who refuses to sell at a suggested price. The Colgate
case has subsequently been narrowed and refined in a number of
ways and is presently limited to a simple refusal to sell without
evidence of pressure on the customer to conform to the seller's
price maintenance program. In United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 4 the Court found that an illegal combination to fix prices
existed where the seller suggests resale prices and secures compli-
ance by means in addition to the "mere announcement" of his
policy and a refusal to deal with distributors who sold to retail
outlets that cut prices, thereby creating pressure to conform. The
Court, in view of Colgate found the practice to be illegal. The
Colgate decision was again considered in Interphoto Corp. v.
Minolta Corp.,35 where the trial court said:
Today, a manufacturer can avail himself of the Colgate doc-
trine only where he suggests a resale price and does not make
any attempts to enforce his suggestion, and he then refuses to
sell to the dissident distributors. Anything beyond this act of
'Doric simplicity' is more than a unilateral refusal to deal and
constitutes a per se violation of the antitrust laws.36
In Albrecht v. The Herald Company,37 the Supreme Court
again confirmed the per se illegality of enforced retail maintenance
programs. In this case the Court found a combination, rather than
a contract or conspiracy, to restrain trade where a newspaper
route carrier purchased his route on an agreement to purchase
newspapers at wholesale and sell over a specified route at retail.
The defendant publisher had objected to a unilateral unauthorized
price increase by the plaintiff carrier. When the plaintiff refused
to change his position, or his price, the defendant contracted
with a private firm to solicit the route and deliver papers at the
lower price suggested by the defendant. The defendant continued
3a 250 U.S. 300 (1918).
34 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
35 295 F.Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y., 1969).
36 Id. at 719.
37 390 U.S. 145 (1967).
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to deal with the plaintiff and to negotiate with him, but also
advised the plaintiff that he could be terminated if he did not
conform to defendant's resale price maintenance program. The
Court found that there was a combination rather than the usual
conspiracy because the defendant had directed the activities of
those with which it was associated rather than conspiring with
them to accomplish a common purpose. Since it is more difficult
to prove a conspiracy than it is to prove a combination, the
decision can be taken to indicate that a lesser degree of proof may
be required of the plaintiff in future price fixing cases where a
combination can be alleged.
Applying the foregoing to trademark franchising, it can be
stated that while Colgate upheld the right of a seller to simply
refuse to deal if the purchaser does not comply with the seller's
wishes as to resale prices, in view of the subsequent cases, it is
doubtful whether a franchisee can any longer even avail himself
of the simple refusal to deal. This is because of the leverage which
the franchisor has in relation to the franchisee. In ordinary
arrangements the franchisee has generally invested a considerable
amount of capital to establish the business under the name and
style of the franchisor. Any suggestion that the franchisor may
withdraw the right to do business under the franchised name,
if the franchisee refuses to comply with a price maintenance pro-
gram or other restraint of trade, would in the normal course of
events have a significant impact on the franchisee and could easily
be interpreted to be something in excess of the "Doric simplicity"
standard set out in Minolta.38
A franchisor is free to maintain resale prices pursuant to a
state fair trade law, but such price maintenance programs must
be rigorously monitored and enforcement of the program must be
even-handed or the franchisor may lose rights and privileges
granted under the fair trade exemption to the antitrust laws.39
Moreover, most fair trade laws prohibit fair trading of a product
if the seller is in competition with his customer for the same class
of consumer.40 This type of provision would prevent a franchisor
from operating his own retail outlets in a state where he intends
38295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
30 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), 50 Stat. 693 (1937).
4016 C.F.R. § 240.9 (1972).
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to take advantage of a fair trade statute. Under the current operat-
ing methods used by most trademark franchisors where there are
both franchisor-owned and independently-owned franchise opera-
tions, this undoubtedly would preclude many franchisors from
adopting fair trade programs. Also, fair trade laws are under
continuing attack from the Department of Justice which maintains
a permanent program to urge state legislatures to repeal fair trade
laws wherever they exist.
While in general, a franchisor must avoid interference with
the prices charged by his franchisees, and may on occasion even
be required to demonstrate affirmatively that franchisees do have
a right to determine their own prices, there are means by which
the franchisor can individually obtain some minimal degree of
price uniformity, even though he may not be able to secure
complete compliance. One method known as "pre-ticketing"
has been used in distribution for resale of products manufactured
by the franchisor. The franchisor suggests a retail price by affixing
a label bearing a "suggested price" to the goods before shipment.
The label generally carries other information about the associated
products so there is some assurance that it will not be removed be-
fore sale and that the customer will see the suggested price. The
Federal Trade Commission generally considers pre-ticketing to be
legal as long as the price is representative of the majority of sales.
This requirement places a burden on the manufacturer to main-
tain contact with his outlets to assure that the price ticketed is
not out of date. Therefore, pre-ticketing may cause the manu-
facturer or licensor to follow the market price rather than lead it.
Another method of providing some price uniformity, which
lilewise carries material risks, involves a program followed by
some franchisors who provide advertising for their franchisees.
In this method, the franchisor publishes his "suggested price" in
advertising copy or material. The franchisee then finds that all
of the advertising material provided for use at the franchise
location and all advertising material exhibited in the media to the
public carries a suggested price structure and that variation from
that price structure is difficult and inconvenient, particularly if his
price is higher than the suggested price. In some cases the
franchise agreement provides that the franchisee will be given a
certain allowance for purchase of local advertising in connection
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With the franchise product, but only on the condition that the
franchisee feature prices acceptable to the franchisor. This prac-
tice was found to be a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
It should be noted that neither of the foregoing methods pro-
vides a significant deterrent to price cutting. They are effective
only with respect to an unauthorized increase in prices except
in those states where the fair trade law allows the trademark
owner to fix the price rather than merely set a minimum price.41
If a franchisor is subsequently charged with an antitrust violation
in connection with any of the foregoing practices, his best line of
defense would, of course, be the necessity for uniform practices
at the franchise locations, but such a defense is weak if he cannot
support the practices as reasonably ancillary to a legitimate pur-
pose. In the case of advertised prices some mitigation of risk may
be achieved through use of a covenant in connection with the
suggested advertised prices that the prices are only suggested
and may be subject to local variation.
Territorial Location Restrictions
Exclusive dealerships, distributorships, franchises, and terri-
tories have been attacked as illegal under the Sherman Act.4 In
general, however, granting an exclusive distributorship of the type
where the franchisor merely agrees not to franchise anyone else in
a specific area is not illegal per se. However, such restraints are
subject to the rule of reason enunciated in Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey v. United States,4" that the Sherman Act does not
prohibit all restraints of trade but does prohibit unreasonable
restraints of trade. In particular, Permalife Mufflers Company,
Inc. v. International Parts Corporation,4 can be interpreted to
hold that the rule of reason applies to exclusive distributorships
in the absence of additional restraint. Arrangements providing
exclusive territories for franchisees are of advantage to both the
franchisor and the franchisee. These arrangements are favored
41 S. OPPENEmm & G. WESTON, FEDmEAL AN TTRUST LAws 484 (3d ed.
1968).42 United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Company, 388 U.S. 365 (1966).
43 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911).
44 393 U.S. 194 (1967).
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by franchisors because of the reduction in cost of sales resulting
from the limited number of dealers with which the franchisor
must deal and because it is easier to find franchisees if territories
are given on an exclusive basis. The franchisee finds exclusive
arrangements desirable because of the lessened intrabrand com-
petition encountered.
The Schwinn case45 clearly demonstrates that territorial limita-
tions are of two general types and there is a significant difference
in the legality of the two. The first type, previously discussed,
involves an agreement where the franchisor merely authorizes the
franchisee to do business in the defined area; the franchisor will
not do business there himself, nor will he engage other franchisees
in the same area so long as the franchisee exerts minimum efforts
for promotion of the franchise system. The second type of terri-
torial limitation, sometimes referred to as territorial confinement,
involves significant and almost conclusive risk of illegality. It pro-
vides for the franchisor to license the franchisee to do business in
the defined territory, agree he will not do business there himself,
that he will not license others to do business in the defined ter-
ritory, and further that the franchisor prohibits the franchisees
from selling to or soliciting business from customers outside their
defined areas.
United States v. Sealy46 involved an agreement in which the
franchisees agreed not to sell outside their respectively assigned
territories. The agreement was found to be illegal per se. While
the actual effect of the decision is clouded somewhat by the fact
that the arrangement was also used for price-fixing purposes, it
nonetheless provides little aid and comfort to those who would
assert that a territorial confining type arrangement can be justified.
At the very minimum the decision stands for the proposition that
there are serious risks involved with restrictive territorial cov-
enants. In a more recent case, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Schwinn4 7 stated that the validity of Schwinn's territorial and
customer restrictions in connection with the sale of bicycles to
distributors for resale to retail outlets depended on whether the
restraints were reasonable and the reasonableness was to be
45388 U.S. 365 (1966).
46838 U.S. 350 (1949).
47 388 U.S. 365 (1966).
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determined by the impact of the restrictions on the market.
Schwinn had imposed exclusive territorial restrictions on distri-
butors whereby the distributors were not to resell outside the
assigned territory. The Court held that:
... where the manufacturer sells a product to its distributors
subject to a territorial restriction upon resale, a per se violation
of the Sherman Act results .... 48
From the foregoing it can be concluded that, at least within
the factual circumstances encountered in the Schwinn arrange-
ment, territorial restrictions on resale of products are illegal. How-
ever, there remains some support for the view that not all ter-
ritorial restrictions are illegal since the Supreme Court did indi-
cate that the initial question in Schwinn was directed to the
reasonableness of the restraint and the impact of the restraint
upon the market. More particularly the Court stated:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons
with which an article may be traded after the manufacturer
has parted with dominion over it. [emphasis added]. 49
The use of the term "without more" in connection with the defi-
nition of per se illegality leads to considerable confusion in the
interpretation of the decision. Specifically, the phrase could be
interpreted to mean that without additional justification the ter-
ritorial restriction is illegal or could be interpreted to mean that
regardless of other justifying matters or circumstances, the re-
striction is illegal.
The Schwinn case did, however, provide express approval for
the practice of exclusive territorial, but not restrictive territorial,
franchises under certain conditions:
A manufacturer of a product, other and equivalent brands of
which are readily available in the market, may select his cus-
tomers and for this purpose he may "franchise" certain of
them to whom alone he will sell his goods. If the restraint
stops at that point-if nothing more is involved than vertical
consignment of the manufacturer's own sale of the merchan-
48 Id. at 379.
49 Id.
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dise to selected dealers, and if competitive products are readily
available to others, the restrictions on these facts alone would
not violate the Sherman Act.r0
Thus, it appears that a franchisor can selectively and exclusively
franchise dealers in selected areas and agree that he will not do
business with others within the area or that he will not do business
directly with customers in the area. He cannot, however, ordi-
narily limit the franchisee to that area and prohibit sales to certain
classes of customers or customers outside the area. In some pre-
vious cases, infra, franchise agreements including certain types of
territorial resale restrictions, have been found legal but the find-
ings are clouded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Schwinn.
Specifically, in Sandura Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,51 the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld resale restrictions because
they were found to be reasonable in view of the relative size of
the franchisor and its competitors. The franchisor demonstrated
that without the restrictions, he would be unable to obtain fran-
chisees. Based on the comments of the court with respect to the
decision in White Motor Co. v. United States,52 there is some
reason to believe the Schwinn decision,53 by implication, can be
interpreted to carve out a possible exception to the illegality of
territorial restrictive agreements in the circumstances somewhat
similar to those presented by Sandura. From the foregoing it
could at least be argued that in the case of a franchisor competing
with a large vertically integrated competitor, territorial restrictions
may in some cases be justified under a "compelling and appro-
priate setting" as mentioned in Schwinn.
I Sherman v. Weber Dental Manufacturing Co.54 involved a ter-
ritorial restrictions' covenant that received approval of the trial
court. The sale contract for the dental equipment sold by the
franchisor included a guarantee of continuing service. Because
the distributor who sold the equipment was responsible for ful-
filling the servicing obligations, distributors were required to
restrict sales to the area which they could reasonably service.
On a Motion for Summary Judgment, the court cited Schwinn and,
o Id. at 876.
51339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
52 373 U.S. 253 (1963).
53 United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 865, 373-4 (1966).
54 285 F.Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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without determining the legality of the arrangement, held that
Summary Judgment would not be appropriate without con-
sideration of the factual basis for the restriction. The court there-
by, arguably, implied that the restriction was not illegal per se
but could be justified as reasonably ancillary to a legitimate busi-
ness purpose.
The present state of territorial restrictions in franchise opera-
tions is unclear. However, in view of the Schwinn finding of
per se illegality, and the decision in Sealy55 and Temkin Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States,5 it can be concluded that a valid
trademark, without more, will not insure the legality of a territorial
restriction and that at best the agreement will stand or fall on
factors other than the trademark license. For example, in Perma-
life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,57 the Supreme Court
indicated that the franchisor was entitled to a trial on the merits
to determine the legality or illegality of an agreement involving
territorial and customer limitations, and whether the restraints
were reasonable to protect the defendant's registered Midas trade-
mark and service mark.
Subsequently, in Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell
Co.,58 the trial court overruled a Motion for Summary Judgment
and indicated that territorial restrictions are not illegal in trade-
mark franchising agreements because the franchisee never receives
control of the trademark which is the subject property of the
license. The basis of the decision is apparently contrary to the
rationale of the Susser case.
As previously mentioned, questions of territorial restrictions
probably do not materially affect a large segment of the trademark
franchise industry (e.g. fast food franchises, motel franchises, or
other established location retail establishments are not affected to
a great extent). In franchise operations where closed territories
are desirable, the use of the "area of primary responsibility" con-
cept may provide some measure of control over wandering fran-
chisees, particularly where the franchisees neglect or otherwise
fail to fulfill their responsibilities in their assigned areas. The
55 338 U.S. 850 (1949).
56341 U.S. 593 (1951).
57392 U.S. 194 (1967).
G8 CCH Trade Cas., ff 73,833 (1972).
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terms of such a covenant, generally provides that the franchisee
will use his best efforts to represent the franchisor and develop
the franchise in the assigned area. The covenant does not ex-
pressly prohibit the franchisee from selling outside the area
assigned, but neglect of the franchise operation in the territory
of primary responsibility for the purpose of pursuing business in
other areas may be the basis for termination of the franchise
agreement. Such covenants may be acceptable so long as they
are legitimately used as part of a program to develop the franchise
product or service.59 Of course, the covenant cannot be used for
the principal purpose of accomplishing effectively closed territory
arrangements by the use of threats, unwritten understandings or
other misuse. The Federal Trade Commission in a recent consent
decree permitted a defendant to designate geographic areas with-
in which a "distributor may devote his best efforts to the area so
designated ... or to represent (defendant) in the area."60
Restrictions on Goods and Services
Purchased and Sold By Franchisees
Franchisors often, with certain justification, take the position
that it is necessary for them to exercise some control over the
products or services offered by their franchisees as well as the
equipment, supplies, and even the services, purchased by fran-
chisees in connection with the operation of the franchise. There
are legitimate reasons for some restrictions and the courts have
upheld such valid restrictions. However, many of the foregoing
restrictions are generally considered as incident to tying (where
a seller agrees to sell or lease one desirable product on the condi-
tion that the buyer also purchase another "tied" product) or as
evidence of exclusive dealing arrangements which can be illegal
under the Clayton Act,6' the Sherman Act,62 or the Federal Trade
Commission Act.6 '
Both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act prohibit tying
r9 See United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Corp., CCH Trade Cas., II 69,011
(W.D.N.Y. 1958).
60 See United States v. Snap-on Tools Corp., CCH Trade Reg. Reports, II
15,546 (FTC Docket No. 7116, 1961); United States v. Philco Corp., CCH Trade
Cas., U 68,409 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
6115 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
62 16 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
63 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
[Vol. 60
1972] SEECED ANTIrhUST AsPEcts op TRADEmAPK FANcHsnwG 659
arrangements. The Sherman Act prohibits every contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade; but it has been inter-
preted to apply only to unreasonable restraints of trade,64 and
not every restraint, since theoretically every contract is a restraint
of trade. In cases where a trademark or trademark franchise is
involved in a direct or indirect tying arrangement, the first ques-
tion is whether the restrictions are illegal per se and, if not, then
whether the restrictions are reasonably ancillary to a legitimate
intent to protect the goodwill or integrity of the trademark. North-
ern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States65 and several of the cases
following Northern Pacific discussed infra, illustrate several ar-
rangements which were held to be tying arrangements where a
trademark was not involved.
In Northern Pacific, the Supreme Court held that under the
Sherman Act, tying arrangements are per se illegal when certain
prerequisites discussed infra, are met. In the Northern Pacific
case the tying product was a lease on railroad property and the
tied product was use of the services of the railroad. The Court
indicated that the prerequisites to a finding of per se illegality are:
(1) "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint
on free competition in the tied product," and (2) "a not insub-
stantial amount of interstate commerce affected thereby."66 The
Northern Pacific case has generally been interpreted to permit
certain restraints which are reasonably ancillary to a legitimate
business purpose. In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp.,67 the Supreme Court reiterated its per se rule in con-
nection with tying agreements as stated in Northern Pacific, saying
it applies "at least when the prerequisites are met."68 The Court
then broadened the coverage of the Sherman Act with respect to
tying arrangements by holding that even when the prerequisites
are not met, so there is no question of per se illegality, Section 1
can be violated by a tying arrangement if the restraint is unreason-
able. However, in Fortner, the Court also noted that the existence
of a legitimate business purpose and the lack of competitive ad-
vantage may be adequate defenses to a Section 1 claim of tying
64 See Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
65 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
66 Id. at7.
67 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
081d. at 498.
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where the arrangement is not per se illegal and the circumstances
support the defenses.69
In trademark franchising arrangements where the franchisee
operates under the name, and assumes the identity of the fran-
chisor, the franchisor will generally find it desirable to control
the types and lines of goods the franchisee sells and may attempt
to justify the restrictions on the basis of the quality control
requirements imposed by the Lanham Act with respect to the
trademark. In the petroleum industry, for example, it is common
for the franchisor to lease the franchise premises to the franchisee
and to supply the franchisee-dealer with his principal com-
modities. The lease is usually for a short period of time so that
the Sword of Damocles forever hangs over the head of the fran-
chisee. This provides significant leverage for the franchisor in
his product sales to the franchisee.70 In Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission,71 the Supreme Court found that as
part of its franchise program Atlantic promoted the purchase of
Goodyear tires, batteries and accessories by the franchisee so that
the Goodyear items would be handled to the exclusion of all
others. In return, Goodyear paid Atlantic, the franchisor here, a
commission based on sales of the products to the Atlantic fran-
chised outlets. Atlantic did not expressly argue that the plan was
necessary to protect the goodwill of its trademark or franchise
program but did argue that it was necessary for its stations to
carry a full line of tires, batteries and accessories to stay com-
petitive. The Court found the contract was not a "tying arrange-
ment" but that "the central competitive characteristics" of the
plan were the same as a tie. The plan was held to be illegal
since (1) a franchisor received a commission for sponsorship, (2)
the franchisor occupied and exercised a dominant position with
respect to the franchisee and (3) a substantial amount of com-
merce was involved.
It can be argued that while the specific arrangement in Atlantic
was not legal, the decision there does not automatically make all
arrangements, where a franchisor requires franchisees to sell only
certain products, illegal. For example, if the franchisor required
69 Id. at 506.
70 Cbazin v. Gulf Oil Corp., 419 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1969).
71381 U.S. 357 (1965).
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a franchisee doing business under the franchisor's trademark to
carry only tires, batteries and accessories bearing the franchised
trademark, to the exclusion of other goods, then it can at least be
argued that the trademark is related to the business purpose of
the franchise. That is, a franchisee doing business under the trade-
mark and style of business of the franchisor should not confuse
the public by offering goods bearing other trademarks.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Co.,72 the Federal
Trade Commission challenged a franchise where Brown provided
franchisees a "carrot" in the form of a plan whereby Brown fur-
nished services (i.e., architectural assistance, signs, forms, group
insurance and other benefits) to independent retailers or fran-
chisees who would agree to concentrate their business within the
grade and price lines of Brown, and also agree not to handle
competing lines of shoes. The dealers or franchisees continued to
do business under their own name, so the importance of the pro-
gram in preserving Brown's goodwill was not at issue even though
the dealers handled Brown trademarked shoes. The Supreme
Court found that since the action was brought by the Federal
Trade Commission under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,73 the FTC need prove only "incipient violation"74 or
restraint, without proof that the restraints amounted to an out-
right violation of the Clayton Act or any other provisions of the
antitrust laws.
In Fortner,7 United States Steel offered special financing
covering not only houses to be sold by United States Steel, but
also, land and the cost of development to the real estate developer,
Fortner. The financing terms offered by United States Steel were
better than those generally available elsewhere and were offered
on the condition that Fortner purchase all of the houses to be
constructed in the development site from United States Steel.
The Court found that there was not just one product involved
and that the second product, the financing, could be a "tying"
product. However, the Court did not determine that the position
of United States Steel in the financing market was sufficient to
72 884 U.S. 316 (1966).
7315 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
74 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320 (1966).75 Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel, 452 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1972).
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constitute a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, but
remanded for a determination at trial.7
6
With respect to franchises which extend beyond the mere pur-
chase and resale of trademarked products, (e.g. the trademark
franchise arrangement where the franchise extends to licensing of
an entire business method or program) it at first glance seems
logical that the franchisor should have a certain degree of latitude
to restrict the goods offered for sale at the franchise location in
order to protect the uniformity of services and goods offered, as
they directly affect the goodwill of the franchise program and the
integrity of the associated trademarks. However, such restrictions
can constitute a restraint of trade, so the franchisor must be ready
to defend these controls. In analysis of trademark franchise
arrangements where the franchisee does business under the
trademark and style of the franchisor, it is useful to divide the
goods or services offered to franchise locations into categories.
Category 1 includes goods used in operation of the franchise loca-
tion which the retail customer or franchise location customer does
not receive directly from the franchisee, and in most cases does not
even see and is thus unable to identify the source or origin of
the goods or to associate the indicated source or origin with the
trademark franchise operation. Such items may include equip-
ment used in operation of the franchise location, paper products
distributed at the franchise location in connection with the
franchised products, such as food, where even though they may
bear the trademark of the franchisor in accordance with the
franchise program the customer cannot identify the manufacturer.
Category 2 includes those items or goods where the customer is
able to determine the source or origin of the goods and associate
the goods with the trademark franchise operation. In a fast food
operation, for example, such items include the trademarked prod-
ucts actually offered for sale at the location. One primary ques-
tion involved in restraints on trademark franchisees is the extent
to which the franchisor can restrict the franchisee stocking, selling
or using Category I or Category 2 items without the restraint
constituting an illegal tying or exclusive dealing arrangement.
77
The applicability of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act to
76 Id.
77 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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trademark franchise arrangements and particularly to "tying" ar-
rangements have been considered on several occasions, as dis-
cussed hereinafter, with differing results. The differences can,
at least in part, be distinguished by the facts of the case. In
Susser v. Carvel,78 a franchise case, the court expressly recognized
that in compelling circumstances, the protection of goodwill, as
embodied in a valuable trademark, may justify an otherwise
invalid arrangement. The reference to protection of trademark
goodwill is, of course, to the Lanham Act.79 In Susser, the Court
of Appeals recognized that there are clearly situations where tying
the purchase of supplies to a trademark license could constitute
a per se violation of the Sherman Act80 and that the trademark
franchise program in Susser was a tying product within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act. However, the court also found that not
all trademark tying arrangements are per se violations."' The
court made an express determination that under the circum-
stances in Susser, a franchisor could specify sources of supply to
be used in manufacturing the trademarked product (the mix and
ingredients for processing ice cream), to protect the integrity of
the product and trademark. This in effect approved franchisor
imposed restraints on purchase of Category 1 items where such
restraints can be justified as reasonably necessary for the protec-
tion of quality and goodwill of the trademark."2 It should also be
noted that the court found that the trademark was displayed on
only about 250 out of a total of 125,000 retail outlets for ice
cream within the relevant market area; in these circumstances the
trademark did not provide market dominance so that the restraint
was not per se illegal.
In Susser, the court also held that it was not precluded from
applying a flexible standard for exclusive dealing arrangements
with respect to the franchisors' requirements that franchise dealers
deal only with trademarked products or franchisor approved
products, so that a uniform line of products would be offered at
every retail outlet.88 This finding can be interpreted to approve
78 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
70 15 U.S.C. § 1064(e) (1970), 60 Stat. 433 (1946).80 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 513 (2d Cir. 1964).
81 Id. at 512.
82 Id. at 519.
83 Id. at 513.
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restraints on franchisees with respect to Category 2 items so long
as certain prerequisites are met. Specifically, the court found
that the franchisor could prohibit franchisees from selling ham-
burgers or Christmas trees through the franchised outlets. In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that in Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,84 the Supreme Court had departed
from its more rigorous and inflexible rule established in Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States, 5 with respect to require-
ment contracts. On this basis the court found that the require-
ment that only Carved products be sold at Carvel outlets is sup-
ported by the reasonably ancillary business purpose that the
public identify each Carvel outlet as one of a chain that offers
identical products with a uniform standard of quality.
The potential for conflict between the Lanham Act policing
requirement and the antitrust laws was considered in Siegal v.
Chicken Delight."6 The district court found that as a matter of
law a tying arrangement existed where Chicken Delight made use
of an admittedly unique registered trademark combined with its
ability to impose tying requirements. In Siegel the franchise ar-
rangements provided that the franchisee would purchase all equip-
ment, paper products, mix, etc. from the franchisor. No royalty
was charged on gross sales, the franchisor relying exclusively on
profits from the paper products, etc. sold to the franchisee for his
profit. The court found that the only justification for the pur-
chasing agreement involved in Siegel would be that the products
the franchisor required the franchisee to purchase were necessary
for protection of quality of the product, and that in this case the
requisite necessity for protection of quality did not exist. The
court found this was particularly true of the paper products since
specifications could be readily established and the paper products
could be purchased from different sources without effecting uni-
formity from outlet to outlet. The decision in the Siegel case was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc.87 The appellate court sustained the trial court in
finding that a trademark license may be a tying item because the
84 865 U.S. 820 (1961).
85 387 U.S. 298 (1949).
86311 F.Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
87448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, -U.S.- (1972).
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rule governing tying arrangements is designed to strike not at
mere coupling of physically separable objects, but rather at the
use of a dominant desired product to compel the purchase of a
second distinct commodity. Therefore, the court found a trade-
mark may not be used to tie other products, such as equipment
and paper products, which can be easily described in specifica-
tions and are not necessary for maintenance of the quality of
the trademark.
Siegel deals primarily with questions involving the franchisor's
restriction on purchase of Category 1 supplies and not with ques-
tions of franchisor's restriction on Category 2 products to be
offered for sale at the franchise location. It should be noted that
Susser dealt with both restrictions in the purchase of Category 1
raw materials and restrictions on the Category 2 products to be
offered for sale at retail. The Susser case specifically approved
the Category 1 restrictions in certain cases, for example, where
the goods could not be adequately specified, contrary to the
situation in Seigel. The court in Susser further approved the re-
strictions on Category 2 goods on the basis of uniformity of the
franchise outlet, a question which was not considered in Siegel.
From the foregoing, it could be concluded that franchisor restric-
tions on Category 2 goods offered for sale at retail, approved in
Susser, were not affected by Siegel, and the franchisor may be free
to restrain the products or services offered from franchised outlets
doing business under the name and style of the franchisor.
The Federal Trade Commission is also concerned with fran-
chise restrictions and in its Ad Hoc Committee Report on Fran-
chising, the Committee stated:
A mere desire on the part of the franchisor to not have his
trademark product associated with other products, particularly
those of competitors, would seem to be difficult to justify in the
ordinary case for the alleged purpose of protecting the quality,
uniformity or image of the trademarked product. This would
be particularly true of those franchise licensing arrangements
in which the franchisee maintains his own identity and trade-
name, as opposed to the franchisee who does business under
the franchisor's name.
Similarly the designation of a particular supplier from whom
associated products (for example, parts, ingredients or food)
must be purchased, or the reservation of such sales to the fran-
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chisor, again appear to be permissible under the present state
of the law only if the associated products were essentially con-
nected with the operation of the trademark products or es-
sential for the maintenance of its quality and this fact could
not be achieved by specifications.
On the other hand, if the franchise extends beyond the mere
sale of a trademark product and encompasses the licensing of
an entire business embracing a specific service or an overall
format or design of operation, the allowable justification for
these restrictions is somewhat broader. However, even in
these franchise arrangements there is little doubt that the rea-
sonableness of any restrictions imposed on this type of fran-
chise would be strictly scrutinized and construed.88
The report further recognizes that an entirely different question
is presented if the franchise label is used solely for the purpose of
establishing a group of captive dealers.
After publication of the Ad Hoc Committee Report on Fran-
chising, the Federal Trade Commission staff filed a proposed
Complaint and Consent Order"9 against Gamble-Skogmo, in which
the Commission charged that Gamble was requiring its Mode-O-
Day franchisees to purchase and sell only products manufactured,
sold or supplied by Gamble. The complaint also alleged price
fixing. The proposed Consent Order prohibits these practices
and would require Gamble to notify its franchisees that they are
free to obtain merchandise of the type customarily sold in women's
and children's ready-to-wear stores from any source and sell it
in the Mode-O-Day shops, so long as the goods are identified
as non-Mode-O-Day. Initially, it would appear that the Federal
Trade Commission proceeding with respect to the Mode-O-Day
case may cast some doubt on statements of the Ad Hoc Committee
Report approving the validity of franchisor restrictions on prod-
ucts offered for sale at retail by franchisees. However, such a
conclusion is clouded by the facts in the case. Specifically, Mode-
O-Day shops were selling products with labels which were not
associated directly with the franchisor Gamble-Skogmo, so the
Consent Order may have been based on the fact that the arrange-
ment fell within the exception noted, infra, in the Committee
88 FTC, REPORT OF AD Hoc CommrrrEE ON FRANcHISmc, June 2, 1969, at 32.89 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., FTC Docket No. CE1-0184,
May 3, 1970.
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Report for franchises used solely for establishment of captive
dealers. Also, the practices of the franchisor allegedly included
price fixing at the franchisee level and provided the Federal
Trade Commission with an adequate basis for broadened remedial
provision.
Other cases dealing with restrictions on goods to be offered
for sale by franchisees are of some interest in this matter and
should be mentioned. In Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Com-
pany,90 the trial court found no antitrust violation in the use of a
dealer arrangement requiring a Lincoln-Mercury dealer "to main-
tain a stock of genuine Mercury parts and approved accessories of
an assortment reasonably comparable to current demand." The
court expressly noted, with approval, that this agreement did not
prevent the dealer from using or dealing in parts made by others
since the pressures to stock Ford parts are legitimate under the
circumstances and did not amount to an implied agreement not
to deal in the goods or commodities of other suppliers.
In Baker v. Simmons Company9l it was determined that an
alleged "tying arrangement" which required hotels and motels
displaying a mattress company's trademark to use that brand of
mattresses exclusively, was pursuant to a legitimate purpose and
was valid.
Thus, it would appear that certain restrictions in the nature of
tying arrangements are permissible under the Sherman Act, the
Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act where a
trademark is involved, but that such restrictions must be very
carefully supported and justified as reasonably ancillary to a
legitimate business purpose, the protection of the goodwill of
the trademark, or some other equally meritorious reason or pur-
pose. From the foregoing it can also be concluded that a fran-
chisor has some right to limit the goods or services offered by his
licensed franchisee when the franchisee adopts the style, format,
and methods of the franchisor and operates under the franchisor's
name, so that customers of the franchise location attribute the
goods and services offered by the franchisee to the franchisor.
But the current judicial attitude toward restrictions in distribution
of goods is not congenial. It can also be concluded that the more
90252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958).
91307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962).
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strictly the franchisor enforces its franchise, the more latitude
available for imposition of restrictions. However, even if all
franchisees follow the prescribed uniform program with uniform
business procedures and operating procedures, every restraint
imposed must still be justified on a case by case, item by item,
basis.
Exclusive Dealing
Franchisors generally engage in arrangements susceptible to
allegations of illegal tying but may, from time to time, find it to
their advantage to use exclusive dealing arrangements, or other
restraints, with respect to sources of supply of raw materials or
supplies which franchisees normally purchase in connection with
the franchise operation. Restraints in the nature of exclusive
dealing arrangements are usually invoked with respect to ma-
terials used in the manufacture or sale of the trademarked item
and such restrictions are usually justified in connection with a
trademark as a quality control measure. While many times the
franchise based restraints are limited to purchase of certain
materials from approved sources, it is also true that in some
cases the franchisor does not overlook the opportunity to make a
substantial profit from the sale of the trademarked item or the
ingredients or accessories used in producing the trademarked
item.
While a customer, acting individually may elect to purchase
his full requirements from a single supplier, it may be illegal for
that supplier and the customer to agree that the customer will not
purchase elsewhere. Likewise it may be illegal for the customer
to agree with other purchasers of like commodities, who are very
likely his competitors, that they will all patronize, or refuse to
patronize, a particular supplier. The exclusive dealing arrange-
ment, whether an outright contract or a covenant in a license
agreement, may tarn out to be a contract or a combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. Where the restraint takes the form of an agreement in
which the franchisee agrees that he will not use or deal in the
goods or wares of competitors of the franchisor, rather than a
simple tying arrangement supported by the franchise agreement,
there may be a violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Standard
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Oil Co. of California v. United States,92 was concerned with con-
tracts obligating service stations to take their full gasoline require-
ments from Standard Oil. The contracts covered 16% of the
retail outlets in the "Western Area." Standard Oil accounted for
28% of the total gallons of gasoline sold in this area. The Court
in holding the arrangements to be in violation of Section 8 appar-
ently based the decision on a rule which seemed to make legality
turn almost entirely on the percentage of the relevant market
foreclosed by virtue of the exclusive dealing arrangement. In
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,93 the Supreme Court
applied a different test from that relied upon in Standard. A fore-
closure of $128 million of coal covered by a utility's twenty-year
requirements contract was held insufficient to make the contract
illegal. While only a 0.77% share of the market was foreclosed,
the Court did not rest on a holding that the share was insubstantial
but, rather, stressed that it was necessary "to weigh the probable
effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition
... and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-
emption of that share of the market might have on effective com-
petition therein." In another approval in Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Brown Shoe Co.,94 the Court adopted an approach which
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits
any exclusive dealing which effectively forecloses competitors
from "a significant number" of outlets.
In the case of exclusive dealing arrangements imposed on
trademark franchisees, where there is no question of per se
illegality so that legality of the restraints is decided by whether
the restrictions are ancillary to a legitimate business purpose. A
trademark license cannot, however, be merely a device to avoid
what would otherwise be violations of the antitrust laws.
CONCLUSION
Thus, except for per se violations, the legality of restraints
imposed in connection with any particular franchise arrangement
must be judged in view of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the franchise system.
92 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
93 865 U.S. 320 (1961).
94 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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While the Lanham Act gives no carte blanche exemptions
from the antitrust laws, there is in some cases reason to conclude
that the admonition of the Lanham Act requiring maintenance
of trademark integrity does authorize certain restrictive covenants
which, while not per se illegal, would otherwise be deemed illegal
restraints of trade and may be effective to authorize in certain
cases, exclusive dealing, tying, or territorial restraints. While every
situation is different, the apparent overall rule applicable in most
cases is that any leverage, trademark or other, which a franchisor
exerts with respect to his franchisees must be used with the utmost
caution and judged as to its legitimate business purpose.
